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BUNCH v. THOMPSON
949 F.2d 1354 (1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS
Timothy Bunch was sentenced to die following his conviction for
capital murder during the commission of an armed robbery. Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-31 (d) (now 4). Bunch, a sergeant in the United States Marine
Corps, killed and robbed Su Cha Thomas while he was stationed at
Quantico in Virginia.
A Virginia investigator and a Commonwealth attorney traveled to
Japan, Bunch's permanent station, in order to question him about the
murder. Bunch signed a consent form and agreed to talk with them.
Bunch claimed that during the interrogation, he requested counsel
"approximately a dozen times," whereas the Virginia officials maintain
that he stated only once that "he felt like he might want to talk to a
lawyer." Regardless of which account was true, Bunch decided to
cooperate and revealed the location of the murder weapon. However, the
Virginia officials themselves determined that an additional consent form
would be necessary before proceeding any further. Bunch refused to sign
the form, and the interrogation ended.
Military personnel transported Bunch to Virginia and turned him
over to state authorities. During the ride to the police station, the Virginia
investigator asked Bunch "if he felt he was ready to sit down and go over
the case." Bunch agreed to talk, signed a consent form, and confessed to
the murder.
At Bunch's trial, the court suppressed the incriminating statement
which Bunch made in Japan, holding that it was obtained in violation of
his right to counsel. The court admitted the Virginia confession,
however, concluding that Bunch had waived his rights. The jury found
Bunch guilty. At the penalty phase, defense counsel called only Bunch's
mother in mitigation. The jury sentenced Bunch to die based on the
vileness of the crime. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2. The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271 (1983). The Virginia courts denied
relief in state habeas proceedings. The federal district court denied
Bunch's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and this appeal followed.
Bunch claimed, inter alia, that the admission of his confession
violated his right to counsel, relying onEdwardsv.Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). Edwardsheld that once a defendant asserts his right to counsel,
law enforcement officials are prohibited from initiating further interrogation and that, if they do, subsequent statements are inadmissible.
Bunch also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds,
some of which were not specifically raised on state habeas. One such
claim which was raised in state proceedings was that defense counsel was
ineffective by failing to call several potential mitigation witnesses.
Bunch also asserted that the Virginia vileness predicate in its death
penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague and that the trial court erred
in failing to provide a limiting instruction.
Bunch assigned numerous other errors. Some of these the court
treated in a conclusory fashion. Others did not involve death penalty law
or are unlikely to arise often because they revolved around facts peculiar
to the case. These issues, which will not be discussed in this summary,
include: whether Bunch had knowingly and intelligently waived his
Miranda rights; whether the Virginia investigators had "scrupulously
honored" Bunch's assertion of his right to remain silent; the admissibility
of autopsy photographs and a photograph of the murdered victim at the
scene of the crime; the sufficiency of evidence to show that the murder
was committed during the commission of a robbery; the constitutionality
of the trial court's failure to provide Bunch with funds to hire a
pathologist; the admissibility of prejudicial statements made by the

defendant; the sufficiency of jury instructions which did not require the
jury to unanimously agree as to which of the three statutory vileness
predicates existed; and whether the trial court erred in failing to strike two
jurors who were biased in favor of the death penalty.

HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bunch's petition,
holding that Edwards did not clearly dictate the result advocated by
Bunch at the time his conviction became final. Bunch v. Thompson, 949
F.2d 1354,1360(4thCir. 1991). The courtrelied onTeague v.Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989), and Butler v. McKellar,494 U.S. 407 (1990), which
held that a "new rule" does not apply to cases which are final before that
new rule is announced. Although Bunch's Edwards claim is clearly
meritorious under current law, the court found that the particular application of Edwards to the admissibility of a confession was "susceptible
to debate among reasonable minds" when Bunch's conviction became
final. Bunch, 949 F.2d at 1360. In particular, the court found that
Edwards was unclear as to what actions constitute "initiation" of a
conversation. As a result, the court refused to apply Edwardsto Bunch's
conviction. The court ruled against some aspects of Bunch's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and found the other aspects procedurally
defaulted. Bunch, 949 F.2d at 1363-65. Finally, the court rejected
Bunch's attacks on the Virginia vileness factor and the trial court's
failure to provide a limiting instruction. Id. at 1367.

ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Edwards claim
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court limited the retroactive
application of any "new rule," barring the use of such a rule on habeas
corpus where the petitioner's conviction became final before the new
rule was announced. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. The Court defined a "new
rule" as one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on
the States or the Federal Government ... [or] if the result was not
dictated by precedent at the time the defendant's conviction became
final."Id. at 301 (emphasis added). Teague prevents habeas courts from
applying newly settled principles of law when those principles were not
in place during the defendant's direct appeal. The result is that habeas
courts examine the validity of a conviction based on precedent which
existed at the time when the petitioner's conviction became final.
The Court extended this doctrine in Butler v. McKellar, holding
that an existing rule is "new" when the issue was "susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds" when the defendant's conviction became
final. 494 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). See case summary of Butler,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. I, p. 2 (1990). The effect of Butler
is to require a habeas corpus petitioner to show that the state court
interpretation of a rule of law on direct appeal was not only incorrect, but
unreasonably so. Ironically, by their own terms both Teague and Butler
announce "new rules" which nevertheless are applied retroactively to
limit the grounds for habeas relief to criminal defendants.
The Fourth Circuit's application of Teague and Butler demonstrates the extent to which the court is willing to go in calling a settled
principle of law a "new rule." The court found that the rule prohibiting
state-initiated interrogation following the defendant's invocation of his/
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her right to counsel was "'susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds' when Bunch's conviction became final. Bunch, 949 F.2d at 1360
(quotingButler,494 U.S. at415). Thecourt thus refused to apply therule
in considering Bunch's habeas petition.
Edwards,decided before Bunch committed the murder, held that
an accused, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added). Bunch was
convicted based on a confession which an investigator obtained after
Bunch invoked his right to counsel. The investigator initiated the
conversation which led to Bunch's confession. However, the Bunch
court finds Edwardsto be less than the "bright-line rule" that it purports
to be, pointing to state court decisions which refused to apply Edwards
at the time. The court found that Edwards was not clear in defining the
type of actions which would constitute "initiation" of a conversation.
According to the majority, it was not until Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638
(1984), that the holding in Edwards became clear. Since Solem was
announced after Bunch's conviction became final, the court refused to
apply it.
It seems apparent that Edwardsunequivocally prohibited the type
of interrogation which occurred in Bunch. As Judge Sprouse states in his
dissenting opinion in Bunch, Edwards "could not have been any clearer
in its holding." Bunch, 949 F.2d at 1368 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). The
court engages in a truly convoluted argument in order to find that the
Edwards rule did not dictate the result advocated by Bunch at the time
of his direct appeal. The majority points to early state court decisions
which misapplied Edwardsas dispositive proof that the rule was not then
clear. As Judge Sprouse notes, "[t]he majority opinion here ... would
interpret Teague as allowing lower courts to render a clear decision ofthe
Supreme Court unclear." Bunch, 949 F.2d at 1370 (Srouse, J., dissenting). However, the Supreme Court in Butlerinvited this type of analysis
by relying on lower court confusion in finding a rule "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds." Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
There simply is not much that defense attorneys cari do to
overcome the negative effects ofTeague and its progeny. Judge Sprouse
is arguably correct in dissenting in Bunch, but the Supreme Court has
indicated its willingness to stretch Teague in order to prevent a reversal
on collateral review. Like any meritorious issue, an Edwards claim
should be recognized and preserved for review. However, there is very
little to prevent a habeas court from finding some nuance of a legal issue
that was unclear at the time of the finality of the habeas petitioner's
conviction. Such a finding allows the habeas court to deny relief. Teague
places a heavy burden on habeas petitioners to show that (1) a principle
of law entitles him/her to relief, and (2) that principle was clear in all
respects at the time of the petitioner's direct appeal. Significantly, the
latest version of the federal crime bill includes a legislative reversal of
Teague. Should this bill become law, all rules, both well-established and
"new," will apply with equal force to all criminal defendants.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Bunch illustrates the deference which a court will exercise in
evaluating decisions made by defense counsel. In collateral proceedings,
Bunch claimed that he was denied his sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to call several mitigation witnesses. Although defense counsel presented a mitigation case
consisting of only one witness, the defendant's mother, the court rejected
Bunch's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Bunch, 949 F.2d at
1363.
Bunch claimed that four witnesses in particular would have
strengthened his case for clemency at the penalty phase: (1) the examining psychiatrist; (2) military officers who had supervised Bunch; (3) the
defendant's father; and (4) the defendant's ex-wife. The court found a

tactical reason for the trial attorney's decision not to call each witness.
The court concluded that the examining psychiatrist's testimony would
have forced testimony on cross-examination of the defendant's selfdestructive and sexually oriented behavior. Id. at 1364. Similarly, the
military officers on cross would have revealed Bunch's poor working
relations with others and facts relating to his drug addiction. Id. The
father's testimony would have contradicted that of the mother, undermining the cornerstone ofBunch's mitigation case. Id. Finally, the court
found it reasonable for the attorney not to contact the defendant's exwife, since Bunch himself requested that the attorney not contact her. Id.
at 1365.
Essentially, if a reviewing court can assign a tactical reason for
decisions made by trial counsel, the court will not find that the defendant
lacked the effective assistance of counsel. This reinforces the importance of effective advocacy at trial. Appellate courts, particularly in
collateral proceedings, are increasingly deferential in reviewing capital
convictions.
It is clear that compliance with a client's wishes in failing to
contact potential mitigation witnesses satisfies the sixth amendment's
guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel. Putting the constitutional issue aside, however, the Virginia rules of professional responsibility do not prevent counsel from contacting witnesses against the
client's will. The attorney, not the client, is responsible for making
strategic decisions such as which witnesses to call to the stand. Especially in a capital case, attorneys should investigate all avenues of
mitigation, even where the client would prefer to leave potential witnesses alone and hope for an acquittal.
Bunch also raised several ineffective assistance of counsel claims
which were omitted from his state habeas petition. The court held that
these issues were procedurally defaulted as a result of that omission. Id.
Thus, a general ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim does not preserve
every alleged deficiency in trial counsel's performance. A state petition
for a writ of habeas corpus must contain every alleged defect. Those
allegations which are not specifically asserted in state collateral proceedings are waived and may not be claimed thereafter in federal court.
C. Constitutional Challenge to Virginia "Vileness" Factor
Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), requires that a capital
sentencing scheme must establish a meaningful method of differentiating between those few cases where the death penalty is warranted and the
many cases where it is not. Several states have followed the Model Penal
Code in attempting to make this distinction based on the "vileness" of the
crime. Model Penal Code section 210.6(3) allows a capital sentence if
the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity."
In Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Supreme Court
struck the application of the Georgia "vileness" factor as unconstitutionally vague because nothing in the factor, without more, evinced any
inherent restraint on the sentencer. The statute in Godfrey allowed
imposition of the death penalty where the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Id. at 432.
The Court reasserted the importance of this issue in Maynard 1'.
Cartright,486 U.S. 356 (1988) (requiring a narrowing construction of
Oklahoma "vileness" factor). See case summary of Maynard, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15 (1988). The Oklahoma statute
permitted capital punishment where the crime was "especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel." The Court held that this language, standing alone,
gave no more guidance than the statute found constitutionally deficient
in Godfrey. Maynard,486 U.S. at 363-64.
Since Maynard, many states have defined the statutory terms
within their respective "vileness" factors in order to provide the narrowing construction that Godfrey and Maynard require. Such a narrowing
construction must itself provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer in
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order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Shell v. Mississippi,111 S.Ct.
313 (1990) (finding a narrowing construction for a component of the
Mississippi "vileness" factor to be unconstitutionally vague). See case
summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991).
Virginia allows a death sentence if the murder was "outrageously
orwantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2264.2. The Virginia statute precisely mirrors the words found to be
constitutionally deficient (as applied) in Godfrey. Thus, under current
law, Virginia may apply its "vileness" factor only if the courts monitor
its use and provide narrowing constructions of the vague language.
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
While Virginia does not require that narrowing constructions be
provided for the sentencing jury, Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,
257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), the Virginia Supreme Court has defined two of
the three factors in its vileness predicate. The court has defined
"depravity of mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychic
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition oflegal malice and
premeditation." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d
135, 148-49 (1978), cert.denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). The court defined
"aggravated battery" as "a battery which is qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act
of murder." Id. In a recent case, Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (1991),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the Virginia narrowing
constructions announced in Smith. See case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
Bunch relied on Godfi'ey and Maynard in his attack on the
Virginia vileness factor. Bunch asserted both that the Virginia vileness

factor was unconstitutionally vague and that the trial court erred in
refusing to provide a limiting instruction. The Virginia Supreme Court
did not explicitly monitor Bunch's conviction to discern whether its
narrowing constructions of the "vileness" factor had been satisfied. In
the absence of the application of a narrowing construction, Bunch's
position is correct as a matter of law. See Lago, Litigating the
"Vileness" Factorin Virginia,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1,
p. 24 (1991); Falkner, The ConstitutionalDeficiencies of Virginia's
"Vileness" Aggravating Factor,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No.
2, p. 19 (1989).
The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected Bunch's attacks. Bunch,
949 F.2d at 1367. The court cited Clozza v. Murray,913 F.2d 1092,1105
(4th Cir. 1990), in support of its holding. The Fourth Circuit rejected a
Godfrey challenge to the Virginia statute in Clozza, also in a conclusory
fashion. Id. The Bunch court attempts to minimize this important issue
by addressing it with only one unsupported sentence. Bunch, 949 F.2d at
1367.
Although the Fourth Circuit continues to ignore the constitutional
attacks on the Virginia "vileness" factor, attorneys should not. The
Godfrey, Maynard and Shell issues can be raised and preserved in the
defendant's motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, in a
motion for a bill of particulars requiring the Commonwealth to disclose
any aggravating factor and any narrowing construction upon which it
intends to rely, and by appropriate objections at the penalty trial when the
jury is instructed.
Summary and Analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday

JONES v. MURRAY
947 F.2d 1106 (1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1984, Willie Leroy Jones was tried in York County, Virginia
for the 1983 capital murders of Myra and Graham Adkins. Evidence at
trial showed that both victims had been shot in the head at close range by
Jones. The medical examiner testified that only Mr. Adkins died quickly.
Mrs. Adkins' gunshot wound, according to the medical examiner, would
have allowed her to live for several hours. Both Mr. and Mrs Adkins had
been covered with fire accelerant and Mrs. Adkins, who was still alive,
had been bound, gagged and set on fire.
Jones was examined, prior to his trial, by three state doctors
pursuant to a court order to determine Jones' competency to stand trial.
Two of the doctors also examined Jones with specific attention to mitigating mental factors. The examining doctors found Jones competent to stand
trial; the doctors also found no evidence of mental mitigating factors.
Immediately before Jones' trial began, the Commonwealth's
Attorney offered two consecutive life terms with additional time for the
arson charge in exchange forJones' pleading guilty to capital murder and
arson. Jones' attorney told him of the offer and reviewed the strengths
and weaknesses of the Commonwealth's case as well as the evidence
against Jones. Counsel told Jones that it was his opinion that there was
a seventy percent chance of conviction and a forty to fifty percent chance
of Jones receiving the death penalty. Jones' attorney made no recommendation to his client and completely left the decision ofwhether or not
to accept the plea bargain to Jones. Jones, stating that he was innocent,
rejected the Commonwealth's offer. Jones was found guilty of capital
murder and sentenced to death.

After Jones' direct appeals and state habeas claims were exhausted, he petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The
District Court denied relief. Jones appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
claiming inter alia that he had not received effective assistance of
counsel and that the jury instructions at the penalty stage of his trial
resulted in unconstitutional application of the aggravating factor used to
support his death sentence.
Jones claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on two
allegations: Jones argued that his attorney neither recommended that he
accept the Commonwealth's plea bargain, nor attempted to persuade him
to accept the plea bargain, and that his counsel failed to investigate
mitigating evidence that could have been used during the penalty phase
of his trial.
Jones also contended that the jury instructions that dealt with the
"vileness" aggravating factorgivenduringthesentencingphaseofhis trial were
unconstitutional. He argued that because the three "vileness" factor components ("torture, depravity ofmind oraggravatedbatteryto thevictim" Va. Code
Ann. §19-2-264.2(C)) were phrased disjunctively on the jury forms and in the
instructions, there was "no assurance that his sentencing jury reached a
unanimous decision as to which component of vileness was presented by his
crimes." 947 F.2d 1106, 1116 (4th Cir., 1991).
Jones also argued that the Virginia vileness aggravating factor
was unconstitutionally vague in that a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction of it had not been applied pursuant to Godfrey v.
Georgia,446 U.S. 420 (1980), and its progeny.
Jones assigned numerous other errors. Some of these the court
treated conclusively. Others did not involve death penalty law or are

